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ABSTRACT 
A key objective of China￿s reform program was to reduce distortions in the 
economic system and enhance growth. However, when implemented in incremental and 
partial ways, local governments or individuals have chance to capture rents inherent in 
the reform process. Young (2000) warned that the rent-seeking behavior might lead to 
increasing market fragmentation. Empirical studies have since shown that this did not 
happen in the product markets. In this paper we argue that as rents from the product 
markets were squeezed out during the reform process,  rent-seeking behavior shifted to 
the factor markets, especially the capital and land markets. The reform process now 
needs to be deepened to ensure that the factor markets also become more integrated and 
efficient.  
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Over the past 25 years, China￿s transformation from a centrally planned to an 
increasingly market driven economy has led to substantial efficiency gains and rapid 
economic growth (Maddison, 1998; Fan, Zhang and Robinson, 2003). However, as 
Young (2000) has argued, the reforms may not have been sufficiently complete to 
improve domestic market integration. This could happen, for example, if increased inter-
regional competition due to fiscal decentralization led local governments to impose a 
variety of trade protection measures against each other. Young￿s work has stimulated a 
series of studies to investigate trends in market integration. A recent survey by the 
Development Research Center of the China State Council (2003) indicates that China￿s 
domestic product markets have actually become more rather than less integrated. 
Measures of regional protection have also declined significantly over the past decade. 
Wei and Fan (2004) show that output prices have become more integrated, and Huang et 
al. (2003) use evidence from the rice market to argue that China￿s commodity markets 
are becoming increasingly integrated as a result of the reforms. Based on a panel data set 
of 32 two-digit industries in 29 provinces, Bai et al. (2004) show that after an initial 
decline, there was an increase in regional specialization of industrial production.  
These findings would appear to contradict Young￿s predictions about worsening 
market fragmentation. However, we argue that such a contradiction need not arise if 
Young￿s work is considered in a broader political economy framework. As argued by 
                                                 
* Xiaobo Zhang is a Research Fellow from Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD) of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and Kong-Yam Tan is a Senior Economist from the 
World Bank, Beijing Office.   10
Piæera (1994) and popularized by Rodrik (1996), reforms often follow a J-curve. That is, 
reforms may initially bring about more distortions but after the negative effects reach a 
certain threshold, the political imperative for in-depth reforms will emerge, creating 
positive effects in the long run (Krueger, 1993). In China￿s case, after a serious trade war 
between regions in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the National People￿s Congress passed 
the ￿Law on Unjust Competition￿ in 1993. The State Council issued an order No. 303 
￿Stipulation of the State Council to Forbid Regional Blockade in Market Activities￿ in 
2001. These more radical measures seem to support the argument by Drazen and Vittorio 
(1993) that crises may be a catalyst for reforms. These laws and regulations may have 
helped remove measures of local protection in product markets and led to a reversal of 
the initial trend towards more market segregation. 
It is also possible that market distortions shift from product to factor markets as 
the reform process proceeds. de Brauw et al. (2002) show that there has been a huge 
transfer of rural labor from the low-productivity farming sector to high-productivity 
nonfarm sectors over the past two decades, suggesting a shift towards a more integrated 
rural labor market.  But this shift, particularly if accompanied by similar improvements in 
other factor markets, should be leading to some convergence in income levels among 
China￿s regional economies. This would follow in theory if the marginal returns to 
factors were equalized across sectors and regions. In reality, however, China￿s regional 
inequality has increased rapidly (Kanbur and Zhang 1999; Gustafsson and Li, 2002), 
suggesting possible greater fragmentation in some markets. If the product and labor 
markets are becoming more integrated as evidenced by the studies mentioned above, then 
could it be that capital markets are becoming more fragmented? The dramatic increase in 
the number of reports on corruption within the banking and real estate sectors suggests 
that rent seeking behavior may indeed have shifted to the financial sector as the reform of 
product and labor markets deepened.
1 We address this question in this paper. 
                                                 
1 Some of the recent reports on rent seeking activities in the banking and real estate sectors include Yang 
Xiuzhu, vice chief of the construction department of Zhejiang Province who extracted bribes from property 
developers and disappeared (Caijing, July 23, 2003); Chen Kai, a local government official of Fuzhou, 
Fujian Province, who borrowed an estimated $50 million from six state banks and provided kickbacks of   11
To assess the degree of factor market fragmentation, we divide the economy into 
four sectors: urban industry, urban services, agriculture, and rural enterprises.
2 Our 
analysis is based on estimating production functions for each sector, using provincial 
time series data for 1978-2001. One side contribution of our analysis is the computation 
of a capital stock series by sector, using fixed investment data from the State Statistical 
Bureau that are not yet fully publicly available. We use our estimated parameters from 
the regression equations to quantify the regional variation in the marginal products of 
capital and labor by sector. The results confirm that labor markets are becoming more 
integrated, but also show that capital markets have become more fragmented. As the 
reforms in the product markets have deepened, the former distortions do seem to have 
shifted to the capital market. In this sense, Young￿s argument is still valid: in a partially 
reformed economy, distortions may beget more distortions. However, the distortions may 
not necessarily arise in the same sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present data on changes in labor and 
capital productivity across sectors and regions in the Chinese economy over recent 
decades. Next, we calculate the Hoover coefficient of localization to examine the trend in 
product market integration. In the fourth section, we quantify regional variations in the 
marginal products of capital and labor, which serve as good indicators of factor market 
integration. We then simulate the efficiency gains for economic growth if the current 
                                                                                                                                                 
around 5 percent of the loans to the lending officers (Washington Post, December 17, 2003), Shanghai real 
estate tycoon; Zhou Zhengyi, who was implicated in an array of illegal loans coupled with default on 
statutory compensations for relocatees whose homes were improperly demolished for redevelopment 
projects (Shanghai Daily, September 6, 2003); former chairman of China Everbright Group, Zhu Xiaohua 
who was sentenced to jail for 15 years in November 2002 for taking bribes worth 4 million yuan (Caijing, 
December 25, 2003); Zhu Yaoming, a stock speculator who was arrested in July 2003 for loan fraud 
involving 2 billion yuan which he borrowed from securities firms and banks to speculate on stocks in the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges (Caijing, December 25, 2003). Numerous Communist Party 
officials have also been ousted for accepting bribes involving property and real estate projects. They 
included former CCP general secretary of Guizhou province, Liu Fangren; former CCP general secretary of 
Hebei province, Cheng Weigao; former Minister of Land and Resources, Tian Fengshan, as well as a 
former vice mayor of Shenzhen Cty and the former mayor and a vice mayor of Shenyang City. 
2 The rural enterprise sector includes all non-farm activities such as rural industry, construction, 
transportation, and commerce.   12
barriers to factor flows across regions and sectors are removed. The paper concludes with 
our conclusions. The appendix provides additional details about our data.    13
II.  CHANGES IN FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Driven largely by institutional reforms, the Chinese economy has experienced a 
dramatic transformation over recent decades.
3 The share of agricultural Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in total GDP declined from more than half in 1952 to less than 20 percent 
in 2001, while the share of the rural nonfarm sector increased from almost zero to more 
than a quarter. Coupled with these structural changes was a massive shift of labor from 
the lower productivity agricultural sector to the higher productivity nonfarm sector. 
However, some factor markets are still fragmented and government policies still retain a 
significant urban bias. For example, the government still invests more in urban than in 
rural areas; universities require higher admission scores for rural than urban students; 
there are still formal and informal restrictions on migration from rural to urban areas; and 
it is much harder for rural small businesses to obtain credit than the urban based, state-
owned enterprises. The recent arrest and release of millionaire entrepreneur Sun Dawu 
for illegally accepting deposits from local residents highlights the difficulties of many 
rural nonfarm enterprises in raising funds from state-owned banks and credit co-
operatives (Economist, 2004). 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 on labor and capital productivities by region and 
sector, respectively, highlight the dramatic changes in factor markets and economic 
structure over the period 1978 to 2001.
4 Labor and capital productivities are calculated as 
the ratios of GDP to labor and capital; they are therefore measures of average not 
marginal productivity. There are large regional variations in labor productivity and which 
have widened over time. The northeast region had the highest labor productivity in 1978, 
but by 2001 it had fallen well behind the eastern region. The regional gap between the  
                                                 
3 Lin (1992) provides a good reference for rural reforms; Theodore et al. (1994) cover the reforms of state 
owned enterprises; Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) explain the rationale behind the successful price reform.  
4 The division of the four regions are as follows: (1): Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin provinces; (2) East: 
Municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai; Hebei, Shangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hainan, Fujian, 
and Guangdong provinces; (3) Central: Shanxi, Henan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Anhui; and (4) West: 
autonomous regions of Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, Sichuan, Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, 
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west and the rest of China has also worsened over time. Compared to labor productivity, 
the regional disparities in capital productivity are much smaller and they have narrowed 
over time.  
Table 2 shows that labor productivity grew the fastest in the rural nonfarm sector 
and slowest in the agricultural sector. Labor productivity began at a relatively low level 
in agriculture and the gap with other sectors is now much wider. The transfer of rural 
labor from farm to nonfarm activities will undoubtedly have enhanced overall economic 
growth and labor productivity. Regarding capital productivity, the rural nonfarm sector 
has again experienced the most rapid growth and by 2001 had achieved the highest level 
of all sectors. These disparities highlight capital market imperfections and the hunger for 
credit and capital that remains within rural areas for nonfarm activities. Broadening 
access to credit and investing more in the rural nonfarm sector would enhance economic 
efficiency and growth.   
To put China￿s economic transformation in a broader international perspective, 
Table 3 compares the labor productivity of the industrial and service sectors relative to 
agriculture for China and several other Asian countries. The differences are stark. The 
labor productivity ratio of industry relative to agriculture is much higher in China than in 
other Asian countries. Moreover, while the ratios for other countries have generally 
remained stable or fallen, the ratio for China has risen substantially over the past 20 
years. The same is true for the labor productivity ratio between the services and the 
agricultural sector. In the one hand, these extremely high ratios for China as well their 
increasing trends are symptomatic of major distortions in China￿s factor markets. On the 
other hand, there is clearly considerable potential for further economic growth simply by 
reallocating labor and capital among sectors.   17
Table 3.  Trends in the Labor Productivity of Industry and the Service Sector 
as a Ratio of Agricultural Labor Productivity, China and Other 
Selected Asian Countries 
Year IN/AG  SE/AG    Year  IN/AG  SE/AG 
China       Indonesia     
1978 7.0  4.9         
1988 4.6  3.8    1993  7.2  3.6 
1995 5.4  3.2    1998  7.0  2.8 
2001 7.5  4.0    2002  6.5  3.0 
           
Philippines       Malaysia     
1989 4.4  2.1    1987  2.7  1.5 
1995 4.5  2.1    1995  2.1  1.8 
2002 4.2  1.8    2001  2.5  1.9 
           
Korea       Taiwan     
1987 2.5  2.6    1988  2.6  3.9 
1995 2.4  1.9    1995  2.9  4.7 
2002 3.1  1.7    2002  3.0  4.5 
           
Japan       US    
1990 3.2  3.0    1987  1.5  1.6 
1995 3.1  3.4    1995  1.8  1.7 
2001 3.3  3.4    2001  1.4  1.3 
Note:  AG: Agriculture; IN:  Industry; SE:  Services 
Source:  Word Development Indicators, World Bank.  
 
   18
III.  TRENDS IN PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION 
In this section, we update Young￿s analysis of the trends in market integration to a 
more recent time period. Following Bai et al. (2004), we use the Hoover coefficient of 
localization to measure the degree of regional specialization. This coefficient measures 
the geographic distribution of production activities within a sector. We define the Hoover 
coefficient of localization using our four-sector breakout of national GDP (farming, urban 









ij =    (1)  
where Yij is GDP of sector i in province j; Yi is national GDP in sector i; Yj is national 
GDP in province j; and Y is national GDP. If Lij equals one, then province j has the same 
share of sector i as China as a whole. We rank all the provinces by Lij in descending 
order. Following the sequence, we calculate the location curve with the y-axis as the 
cumulative percentage of GDP in sector i  over the provinces and the x-axis as the 
cumulative percentage of national GDP for all sectors over the provinces. Similar to the 
Lorenz Curve and Gini coefficient for income distribution, the Hoover coefficient of 
localization is defined as the ratio of the area between the 45-degree line and the location 
curve and the area of the entire triangle. Finally, we compute the average Hoover 
coefficients across the four sectors using GDP as a weight.  
As shown in Table 4 and graphed in Figure 1, the Hoover coefficients for the 
farming, urban industrial, and rural nonfarm sectors declined in the 1980s, indicting 
decreasing regional specialization in the early period of reform. The result is consistent 
with Young￿s finding on the evolution of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. 
However, the coefficients increased in the 1990s, leveling off in most cases at values that 
were considerable higher than observed in 1978. In other words, regional specialization 
did improve with the reform process, but took some years to materialize. The Hoover 
coefficient for urban services increased the most (from 0.14 to 0.97), showing that this 
sector has become the most specialized.     19
Table 4.  Hoover Coefficients of Localization by Sector, China, 1978 to 2001 
Year Average  Farming  Urban  IndustryUrban Service  Rural nonfarm 
1978 0.32 0.45  0.27  0.14  0.45 
1979 0.32 0.46  0.27  0.13  0.44 
1980 0.31 0.46  0.25  0.16  0.44 
1981 0.32 0.46  0.26  0.17  0.43 
1982 0.32 0.44  0.26  0.17  0.42 
1983 0.30 0.40  0.24  0.18  0.43 
1984 0.30 0.40  0.23  0.20  0.45 
1985 0.30 0.44  0.24  0.23  0.43 
1986 0.30 0.44  0.22  0.25  0.45 
1987 0.30 0.46  0.22  0.30  0.45 
1988 0.29 0.46  0.20  0.29  0.46 
1989 0.29 0.49  0.21  0.29  0.46 
1990 0.30 0.47  0.21  0.30  0.46 
1991 0.29 0.49  0.20  0.32  0.46 
1992 0.31 0.52  0.21  0.39  0.47 
1993 0.35 0.52  0.26  0.48  0.50 
1994 0.38 0.54  0.29  0.58  0.50 
1995 0.43 0.56  0.34  0.71  0.54 
1996 0.44 0.56  0.34  0.72  0.53 
1997 0.41 0.59  0.29  0.77  0.51 
1998 0.41 0.59  0.28  0.84  0.53 
1999 0.44 0.61  0.34  0.88  0.54 
2000 0.43 0.63  0.31  0.95  0.52 
2001 0.40 0.64  0.29  0.97  0.48 
 














   20
The average coefficient calculated across all sectors followed a J curve. An initial 
decline was followed by an upward trend that led by 2001 to a higher overall degree of 
regional specialization than in 1978. This confirms that there has been an overall 
improvement in product market integration. In general, the evolving pattern of regional 
specialization reported here for a four-sector disaggregation of GDP echoes the findings 
of Bai et al. (2004) based on a 36-industry breakdown. Our findings are also consistent 
with the literature on the political economy of reform as argued by Drazen and Vittorio 
(1993) and reviewed by Rodrik (1996) that crises often precede reforms and reforms 
often follow a J-curve. The initial product market reforms may have brought about more 
distortions in the short run, but after the government responds to the crises by deepening 
reforms, the rents in the product markets have been squeezed out over time.    21
IV.  VARIATIONS IN MARGINAL RETURNS TO CAPITAL AND LABOR 
Having shown recent trends in product market integration, we turn now to an 
analysis of possible disequilibria in the factor markets. From economic theory we know 
that resource allocation is most efficient when the marginal products of each input are 
equalized across sectors and regions. By calculating inter-sectoral and inter-regional 
variations in the marginal product of each factor, we can uncover the degree of factor 
market distortions and hence the opportunities for achieving greater economic efficiency 
through improved factor allocation.
5 To calculate the marginal productivities of each 
factor, we use regional and time series data to estimate production functions for each of 
our four sectors.                      
Given the sector-wide shift in China￿s economic structure in recent decades, we 
chose a functional form that allows the input elasticities to vary over time in the 
estimated production functions. Also, to avoid potential heteroscedasticity problems due 
to large regional differences, we add regional dummies to the production functions. We 
specify the following functional form for sector i:  
( ) . ) (X ln ln ijkt ijt
m
m im ikt k it ijt R C B A Y ε + + + = ∑ ∑    (2) 
Where Ait = ai0 + ait t + aitt t
2, and Bikt = bik + bikt t. Yijt is GDP of sector i in 
province j and Xijkt is the k
th input for sector i in province j. Rm is regional dummy for 
region m and Cim is the corresponding coefficient for sector i. Within each time period 
(fixed t) and each sector, the production function is of Cobb-Douglas form. Because the 
output and input factors may be influenced by the same factors, it is likely that 
endogeneity will be present. However, due to lack of viable exogenous instruments for 
cross-sectional regressions, the treatment of endogeneity problems is often less 
satisfactory (Durlauf, 2001). Since the main purpose of this study is to uncover the 
                                                 
5 Desai and Martin (1983) have estimated the efficiency loss due to resource misallocation in the former 
Soviet industry using similar method.    22
correlations rather than the causality between the input and the output variables, the 
potential endogeneity problem may be less serious.  
It is well known that education levels between cities and rural areas are 
substantially different. However, since we do not have a suitable education variable that 
can capture differences in the education status of the labor force in different sectors and 
regions, we could not control for labor quality in the regressions. As a rough test of the 
potential biases that might arise from this simplification, we used the fact that the most 
highly educated part of the labor force is concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, 
and re-estimated our production functions after dropping these cities from the analysis. 
The results did not change significantly, providing some assurance that the results are not 
sensitive to our inability to control for labor quality.  
A detailed description of the data used is provided in the Appendix. We used data 
for 24 years (1978-2001) for 28 provinces, providing a panel of 672 observations. Tibet is 
excluded mainly because of lack of data. For data consistency, Hainan and Chongqing 
provinces are included in Guangdong and Sichuan provinces although they were 
separated in 1987 and 1997.  
The results of the estimated production functions for the four sectors are presented 
in Table 5.
6 The estimated function for agriculture includes land as a separate input in 
addition to capital and labor. Because agricultural output is measured as value-added, 
intermediate inputs such as fertilizer are excluded from output measures by definition. 
Including fertilizer and other intermediate inputs is more appropriate in estimating a 
production function for gross output. The regression results for agriculture indicate that 
land still plays an important role in Chinese agricultural production and that even though 
the elasticity is diminishing over time it was still 0.332 even at the end of sample period. 
The strong, positive coefficients on the time-trend variables imply that technical change 
                                                 
6 The calculations of variations in marginal products of factors are rather robust to various specifications in 
large because marginal products are mainly determined by factor productivity rather than by the estimated 
elasticities. For simplicity, the inequality measures based on several alternative specifications are not 
reported here but are available upon request.    23
played a vital role in driving Chinese agricultural production during the study period. The 
time-varying coefficients for capital and labor are positive and negative, respectively, 
suggesting that the agricultural sector has become more capital intensive and less labor 
intensive.  
 
Table 5.  Estimated Production Functions by Sector, China 
 Agriculture  Urban  industry  Urban service  Rural nonfarm 
Labor  0.714** (0.064) 0.889**  (0.063)  0.578** (0.055)  0.411**  (0.061) 
Capital  0.016 (0.043)  0.262**  (0.064)  0.183** (0.044)  0.294**  (0.069) 
Land  0.293** (0.062)             
Labor*t*10  -0.490** (0.122)  -0.004  (0.123) 0.463** (0.121) 0.358** (0.124) 
Capital*t*10  0.046  (0.080)  0.009  (0.115) -0.056 (0.086)  0.043 (0.129) 
Land*t*10
 
0.279** (0.122)             
Labor*t
2*100  0.148** (0.050)  -0.046 (0.052)  -0.262** (0.054) -0.122**  (0.051) 
Capital*t
2*100  0.022 (0.033) 0.025  (0.045)  0.106** (0.037)  0.033  (0.052) 
Land*t
2*100  -0.114** (0.050)             
Time trend  0.153** (0.048)  0.016  (0.044)  -0.087** (0.038) -0.113**  (0.031) 
Time trend
2*100  -0.287 (0.194) 0.242 (0.186)  0.449** (0.167)  0.596**  (0.139) 
Eastern  0.086** (0.037) 0.363**  (0.038)  0.318** (0.043)  -0.413**  (0.052) 
Central  -0.201** (0.031) -0.128**  (0.038) 0.146** (0.035) -0.511**  (0.053) 
Western  -0.489** (0.034)  0.024  (0.044) -0.009 (0.039)  -0.805**  (0.053) 
Adjusted R
2  0.956 0.936  0.955  0.963 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The symbols * and ** indicate 5% and 10% significant 
levels, respectively. 
 
The estimated labor and capital elasticities for urban industry do not change 
significantly over time. The urban service sector has become increasingly capital 
intensive, probably reflecting the heavy investment in urban real estate. The most striking 
phenomenon in the rural nonfarm sector is that labor elasticities have increased over time, 
indicating increasing returns to scale in the industry and greater alignment with rural 
China￿s comparative advantage.  
Differences in estimated elasticities for the same input across sectors reflect 
differences in production technology, but on their own do not provide any indication of 
how efficiently resources are allocated. To obtain such insights it is necessary to calculate 
the marginal productivities of each factor. Given the estimated time-varying parameters, 















=  (3) 
where k denotes factor, i represents sector and j stands for province. Bikt is from equation 
(2).  
To quantify the degree of variation in the marginal products of inputs, we use a 
Generalized Entropy (GE) inequality measure. Following Shorrocks (1980), the variation 
in marginal product of factor k at time t can be written as: 
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where Mijk denotes the marginal product of factor k for sector i in province j, µ is the 
sample mean, wij is the share of GDP of sector i for province j in total GDP. GE(0) is the 
mean logarithmic deviation, GE(1) is the Theil index, and GE(2) equals half the square of 
the coefficient of variation. We use the simplest form of this equation in which c = 0. The 
results for c=1 and 2 are similar to the results when c=0.  Because each province has four 
sectors, we have 2,688 observations in total.  
Table 6 reports the variations in marginal products of labor and capital. The 
marginal product of labor has shown some convergence over the reform period, except in 
the last five years of our analysis (but which may be the result of some changes in the 
way the labor surveys were conducted during those years￿see appendix). The overall 
variation in the marginal product of labor initially declined from 0.45 in 1978 to 0.29 in    25
Table 6.  Variation in the Marginal Products of Labor and Capital, China, 
1978 to 2001  
   MPL      MPK  












1978 0.45  84.3  12.0  0.23  29.4  8.6 
1979 0.41  84.5  11.5  0.23  32.0  10.0 
1980 0.40  85.1  12.9  0.20  32.0  9.5 
1981 0.38  83.5  14.3  0.21  34.1  13.2 
1982 0.36  84.0  12.6  0.21  37.8  15.3 
1983 0.35  83.6  12.0  0.23  40.2  14.0 
1984 0.34  83.2  11.9  0.23  41.4  14.9 
1985 0.38  83.7  14.7  0.20  42.8  16.3 
1986 0.36  84.1  13.7  0.20  43.9  16.6 
1987 0.35  83.9  14.4  0.19  45.5  16.3 
1988 0.34  83.1  14.1  0.16  46.4  12.8 
1989 0.34  82.8  14.7  0.17  47.8  15.1 
1990 0.35  79.9  14.5  0.18  56.3  13.9 
1991 0.34  79.8  14.3  0.17  53.7  12.4 
1992 0.34  77.1  16.0  0.16  51.9  12.5 
1993 0.33  70.3  18.1  0.18  51.0  9.5 
1994 0.31  66.7  19.7  0.23  49.5  12.8 
1995 0.31  62.1  23.3  0.28  56.1  17.5 
1996 0.29  63.1  23.0  0.29  66.6  19.9 
1997 0.30  60.6  22.2  0.28  70.4  15.1 
1998 0.32  61.8  19.2  0.30  71.4  10.7 
1999 0.35  66.3  15.6  0.35  74.5  8.3 
2000 0.37  65.8  17.5  0.35  76.0  7.4 
2001 0.37  67.4  16.2  0.35  80.0  3.2 
 
1996 and then increased to 0.37 in 2001.
7 On the other hand, the variation in the marginal 
product of capital declined from 0.23 in 1978 to 0.16 in 1991 but then rose substantially 
to reach 0.35 by 2001. As graphed in Figure 2, the marginal product of capital become 
increasingly divergent during the 1990s, suggesting greater fragmentation of capital 
markets. This finding is consistent with Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2003) although they 
                                                 
7 If excluding Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin in the sample, the variation in MPL declines from 0.41 to 0.30 
from 1978 to 2001, while the variation in MPK increases by 81% from 0.23 to 0.35. In other words, 
dropping the three cities with the highest educational level does not affect the basic results from the whole 
sample.    26
use alternative approaches and data.
8 The results suggest that, faced with growing 
competition in product and labor markets, local governments may have tried to collect 
more rent in urban sectors such as real estate and infrastructure projects. In this sense, our 
findings support Young￿s argument that partial reforms may lead to more distortions in 
the remaining economy. 
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As is well known, the GE family of inequality measures can be decomposed into 
the sum of within and between group components for any given partitioning of the 
population into mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups. Using the ratio of between-
inequality to overall inequality, we can calculate the polarization index following the 
method outlined by Zhang and Kanbur (2001).
9 Table 6 and Figure 3 present the sectoral 
and regional polarization indices for the marginal products of capital and labor. As more 
inter-sectoral variations in the marginal products of labor and capital contribute far more 
to overall inequality than inter-regional variation. In particular, the sectoral polarization 
                                                 
8 They use two methods to test the degree of capital market fragmentation based on provincial data from 
1978 to 2000. The first approach is to examine the correlation of local savings and investment. Under an 
integrated capital market, the correlation should be low. The second approach, drawing from the risk 
sharing literature, is to check the degree of consumption smoothing across time and space, which is an 
important indicator for measuring capital mobility and asset market completeness.  
9 A polarization index is defined as the ratio of between-inequality to overall inequality.    27
index on the marginal product of capital has increased. This provides further evidence 
that as the reform process has deepened in the product market, rent seeking distortions 
may have shifted to the capital market.  
 
Figure 3.  Polarization Measures by Sector and Region 
These results indicate that there is room to improve China￿s overall economic 
efficiency simply by reallocating factors among sectors and regions. Our results suggest 
that reversing the entrenched urban-biased investment policies and undertaking in-depth 
reforms within the financial sector might not only improve economic efficiency the most 
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V. POLICY  SIMULATIONS 
How large are the potential gains from improving factor market performance? To 
answer this question, we use the estimated production functions in Table 5 to calculate 
the potential increases in national GDP obtainable from simulated factor reallocations. 
Considering the low labor productivity in the agricultural sector, our first experiment is to 
move additional labor out of the agricultural sector. Using 2001 as a baseline, we 
evaluate three scenarios: moving 1%, 5%, and 10% of the agricultural labor force out of 
agriculture and distributing it equally among the other three sectors. As shown in Table 7, 
even reallocating just one percent of the agricultural labor force could increase national 
GDP by 0.7%. If the share of labor reallocated is 5% and 10%, then national GDP would 
increase by 3.3% and 6.4%, respectively. 
 
Table 7.  Impact of Alternative Policy Simulations on China￿s GDP 
Simulation 1:  
Move x% of the agricultural labor force out of agriculture into 
other rural sectors   1% 5%  10%
Change in national GDP over 2001 (%)  0.7  3.3  6.4
      
Simulation 2:  
Reallocate x% of investment from cities to rural areas  1% 5%  10%
Change in national GDP over 2001 (%)  0.7  3.2  5.9
      
Simulation 3:  
Add x billion Yuan of investment in rural areas   10 50  100
Change in national GDP over 2001 (%)  0.2  0.8  1.7
Change in national GDP over 2001 (Billion Yuan)  21.4  85.4  181.5
 
In the second experiment, we simulate a change in the current urban biased 
policies by shifting investment from cities to rural areas while keeping total investment 
constant.
10 Reallocating 1%, 5%, and 10% of urban investment, respectively, to rural 
areas leads to gains in national GDP of 0.7%, 3.2%, and 5.9%, respectively.  These are 
                                                 
10 We recalculate the capital stock according to equation (1) in the appendix using the new investment data.    29
very similar in magnitude to the results obtained above by reallocating labor from 
agriculture to other sectors. 
In the third experiment, we assume the government makes additional investment 
in rural areas, and that these are equally distributed between the agricultural and rural 
nonfarm sectors. Additional 10 billion Yuan of investment in rural areas yields an 
increase in national GDP of 0.2%, equivalent to 21 billion Yuan. This gives a very 
favorable benefit/cost ratio of 2.1. Considering that the farm and rural nonfarm sectors 
are labor intensive, this scenario would likely also help raise the incomes of many of the 
poorest people in China. When the size of investment increases to 50 and 100 billion, 
national GDP increases by 0.8% and 1.7%, respectively, with benefit/cost ratios of 1.7 
and 1.82.  
The policy simulation highlights the potential economic gains from reallocating 
factors from low to high productivity sectors. Removing barriers to labor movement, 
reversing the urban bias in government investment policies, and deepening the reforms 
would significantly enhance overall economic growth. In addition, these policy changes 
could also bring about favorable distributional effects by reducing regional and sectoral 
inequalities. Since large inequalities are a potential source of social conflict and 
instability, the far-reaching social impact of these policies could be equally important.  
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A key objective of China￿s reforms has been to reduce economic distortions and 
improve market efficiency. This paper examines the changing patterns of distortions 
during the reform process, shows how past policies contributed to these distortions, and 
estimates the cost to the economy in terms of lower output and greater regional and 
sectoral disparities. It is shown that after an initial period of increasing fragmentation in 
product markets, these markets became progressively more integrated as the reform 
process proceeded. The labor market also become increasingly integrated due to a large 
shift of the labor force from the agricultural sector to nonfarm sectors and with less 
control on worker migration. However, inter-sectoral differences in the marginal products 
of capital widened during the reform process, suggesting increasing segmentation of the 
capital market.  
Local governments seem to have been a driving force behind much of the rent 
seeking behavior. In the early stages of the reform, distortions begot more distortions as 
Young has shown. However, in response to an initial increase in product market 
fragmentation, the central government implemented measures to remove local protection. 
Consequently, as opportunities to collect rents in product and labor markets diminished, 
rent-seeking behavior simply shifted to the financial and land markets (including 
infrastructure and real estate). For local governments, these are the last two bastions for 
collecting rents, as well as breeding grounds for corruption.  
If the reform process is evaluated on the basis of the performance of the product 
markets, then the observed behavior supports the J-curve theory of economic reforms:  
initial distortions induced by the reforms soon disappear as the government responds and 
deepens the reform process. However, when a broader view is taken of all the relevant 
product and factor markets, the results support Young￿s argument that as some distortions 
in a partially reformed economy are removed, new distortions may appear, even if in 
other markets. The key to successful reform is to deepen the process to squeeze out the 
distortions in the capital and land market as well as in the product and labor markets.    31
The continuing large differences in both labor and capital productivity across 
sectors suggest that China still has great potential for further efficiency gains through 
continued structural change. To realize this potential, restrictions on factor movement, 
especially inter-sectoral capital movements, need to be removed. Efficient capital markets 
that can funnel new investment to sectors with higher returns still need to be developed. 
The particularly higher capital returns in the rural nonfarm sector suggest that more 
aggressive government policies should be sought to increase investment there, or at least 
not to hinder capital movement to those sectors. Such policies would not only improve 
overall economic performance, but also narrow the development gap and inequality 
between the rural and urban sectors. Similarly, the government should also encourage 
labor movement from agriculture to rural enterprises, urban industry, and service sectors 
as labor productivity in these sectors continues to be much higher than in the agriculture 
sector. 
While the empirical estimates and policy simulations reported here can help to 
provide rough orders of magnitude about the seriousness of the structural problems 
identified, policy recommendations for eliminating these distortions need to take into 
account complex issues, such as their political feasibility, sequencing, implementation 
problems, the nature of vested interests and ways to overcome them, the need to 
minimize negative side effects, and their effects on household equity, regional disparities 
and rural-urban inequality.   32
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APPENDIX  DATA 
A. GDP 
Both nominal GDP and real GDP growth indices for various sectors from 1978 to 
1995 are available from SSB’s The Gross Domestic Product of China (SSB, 1997a). The 
data sources and method of constructing national GDP estimates were published by the 
State Statistical Bureau (SSB, 1997b). This publication indicates that the SSB has used 
the U.N. standard SNA (system of national accounts) definitions to estimate GDP for 29 
provinces by three economic sectors (primary, secondary, and tertiary) in Mainland 
China for the period 1952-95. Since 1995, the China Statistical Yearbook has published 
GDP data every year for each province by the same three sectors. Both nominal and real 
growth rates are available from these SSB official publications.  
We use four sectors in our analysis: agriculture, urban industry, urban services, 
and rural enterprises. The agriculture sector is equivalent to the primary sector used by 
SSB. The following procedures were used to construct GDP for the other three sectors. 
Until 1996, China published annual gross production values for rural industry and 
services. Since 1996, they began to publish value added figures in China Township and 
Village Enterprise Statistical Yearbook (SSB). The definition of value added is GDP 
originating in the sector.  The Ministry of Agriculture published data on both gross 
production value and value added for rural industry (including construction) and services 
in China’s Agricultural Yearbook, 1996. The data on nominal value added for rural 
industry and services prior to 1995 were estimated using the growth rate of gross 
production value and 1995 value-added figures, assuming no change in the ratio of value 
added to gross production value.  
GDP for rural industry was subtracted from GDP for industry as a whole (or the 
secondary sector as classified by SSB) to obtain GDP for urban industry. Similarly, GDP 
for rural services was subtracted from service sector GDP as a whole (or the tertiary 
sector as classified by SSB) to obtain GDP for the urban service sector. GDP for rural 
enterprises is the sum of GDP for rural industry and rural services.    36
The implicit GDP deflators by province for the three sectors are estimated by 
dividing nominal GDP by real GDP. These deflators are then used to deflate nominal 
GDP for rural industry and services to obtain their GDP in real terms.  
B. LABOR 
Labor input data for the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors at the provincial 
level after 1989 can be found in SSB’s Statistical Yearbooks (various issues), while 
provincial labor data prior to 1989 are available in SSB (1990). Labor is measured in 
stock terms as the number of persons at the end of each year. For rural industry and 
services, prior to 1984, labor input data at the township and village level but not at the 
individual household level are available in SSB’s Rural Statistical Yearbooks. The 
omission of individual-household, non-farm employment data will not cause serious 
problems, as the share of this category in rural employment was minimal prior to 1984. 
Urban industry labor is estimated by subtracting rural industry labor from total industry 
labor, and urban service labor is similarly estimated as total service labor net of rural 
service labor. However, since 1997, the discrepancy between the labor data at the 
national level by sector and the sum of the data at the province level by sector has shown 
a large increase. Private conversations with officials in the China Statistical Bureau 
revealed that the national labor force data are more accurate because they are generated 
from either census or population sample surveys. The provincial labor force data are 
reported from lower level governments. When labor becomes more mobile, the difference 
between the two measures gets larger. In this paper, we adjust labor force data by sector 
for each province based on the values in 1996 and the annual growth rates of national 
labor force by sector. The measured trend in capital market integration still holds after 
this adjustment of the labor force data. However, the variation in the marginal product of 
labor increases slightly after 1997 when using the unadjusted rather than the adjusted 
labor force data.    37
C. CAPITAL STOCK 
It is a difficult task to estimate capital stocks by sector and by province. Chow 
(1993) estimates China￿s capital stock for five sectors from 1952 to 1988. Because his 
data series are at the national level, we cannot use them to estimate capital stocks at the 
provincial level directly. In addition, his five sectors are different from our four sectors.  
Li (2003) constructs capital stocks by province from 1984 to 1998 using similar 
methods to Chow￿s. The biggest challenge he faced was to construct the initial capital 
stock values in 1984. He first derived the share of provincial real gross investment and 
applied it to Chow￿s national capital to construct the initial provincial capital stock. An 
implicit assumption made here is that the provincial share of real gross investment equals 
the provincial capital ratio. However, his capital stock is not sector specific and cannot be 
used directly in our analysis. So we had to seek alternative approaches. 
Capital stocks for the four sectors are calculated from data on gross capital 
formation and annual fixed asset investment. For the three sectors classified by SSB, the 
data on gross capital formation by province after 1978 was published by SSB (1997). 
Gross capital formation is defined as the value of fixed assets and inventory acquired 
minus the value of fixed assets and inventory disposed. To construct a capital stock series 
from data on capital formation, we used the following procedure. Define the capital stock 
in time t as the stock in time t-1 plus investment minus depreciation: 
1 - t K δ) (1− + = t t I K    (1) 
Where Kt  is the capital stock in year t, It  is gross capital formation in year t, and δ 
is the depreciation rate. China Statistical Yearbook (SSB, 1995) reports the depreciation 
rate of the fixed assets of state owned enterprises for industry, railway, communications, 
commerce, and grain for the years 1952 to 1992. We use the rates for grain and 
commerce for agriculture and services, respectively. Since 1992, SSB has ceased to 
report official depreciation rates. For the years after 1992, we used the 1992 depreciation 
rates.   38
To obtain initial values for the capital stocks, we used a similar procedure to 
Kohli (1982). That is, we assume that prior to 1978, real investment grew at a steady rate 






K      (2) 
This approach ensures that the 1978 values of the capital stocks are independent 
of the 1978-95 data used in our analysis. Moreover, given the relatively small capital 
stocks in 1978 and the high levels of investment, the estimates for later years are not 
sensitive to the 1978 benchmark values of the capital stocks.  
Estimates of capital stocks for rural industry and services are constructed using 
the annual fixed asset investments by province from 1978 to 1995, which are available in 
the annual China Statistical Yearbooks and the China Fixed Asset Investment Statistical 
Materials, 1950-95. Initial values are calculated using equation (4), but the growth rate of 
real investment prior to 1978 is assumed to be four percent. Again, the initial capital 
stocks are low, so the estimated series are not sensitive to the benchmark starting values. 
The capital stocks data from 1996 to 2001 are obtained directly from SSB.  
The capital stock for rural industry was subtracted from that of total industry (or 
secondary industry as classified by SSB) to obtain the capital stock for the urban industry 
sector. Similarly, the capital stock for rural services was subtracted from the stock for the 
aggregate services sector (or tertiary sector as classified by SSB) to obtain the capital 
stock for the urban services sector. Finally, the capital stock for rural enterprises was 
obtained as the sum of the capital stocks for both rural industry and services.  
Prior to constructing capital stocks for each sector, annual data on capital 
formation and fixed asset investment was deflated by a capital investment deflator. The 
SSB began to publish provincial price indices for fixed asset investment in 1987. Prior to 
1987, we use the national price index of construction materials to proxy the capital 
investment deflator.   39
It is worth noting that, when aggregating provincial capital stocks to the national 
level and comparing the aggregate with Chow￿s series for the common period of 1978-
1988, we find the two series share a very similar trend. We also compare our provincial 
capital stocks with Li￿s. As shown in Figure 4, the two data series are closely correlated 
to each other except in a few provinces. One outlier is Liaoning Province. Li (2003) 
reports that Liaoning Province has the largest capital stock with a value of 2,918 hundred 
million Yuan 1984, compared to 1,767 and 1,134 hundred million Yuan in Jiangsu and 
Guangdong Provinces. However, the official source (SSB, 1997a) shows that the fixed 
capital formation data for the three provinces are 62.33, 77.96, and 142.52 hundred 
million Yuan, respectively. Our capital stocks for the three provinces are 744.78, 
1077.76, and 843.08 hundred million Yuan, respectively. It seems our series for Liaoning 
Province is more consistent with the capital formation data. Because Li￿s paper does not 
include capital data by sector, we cannot further compare our sectoral capital stocks with 
his. Despite the difference of the three capital stocks series, they are complementary to 
each other. When they do overlap, the data series are quite consistent.   
 
















Note: The unit is hundred million Yuan.   40
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